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GISSEL BARGAINING ORDERS: CIRCUIT COURTS
'STRUGGLE TO LIMIT NLRB ABUSE
The National Labor Relations Act (the Act)i grants private sector
employees 2 the right to organize and bargain collectively with their
employer.' The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) implements
the Act's policies protecting the right of employees to determine freely
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress enacted the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act (the Act) in 1935. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No.
198, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). Congress intended the Act to minimize industrial strife
by eliminating the inequality of bargaining power between employers and their employees.
See 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (congressional declaration of policy); see also NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 614 (1939) (Act manifests congressional intent to regulate com-
merce by protecting employees' right to collective bargaining). By granting workers the
right to organize, Congress provided employees with bargaining power in the form of
numerical strength so that employees and employers could negotiate and settle labor disputes
without the need for judicial intervention. See 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (con-
gressional declaration of policy); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 481
(1960) (labor policy as contemplated by federal legislation is matter for Congress and not
for courts). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319
(1951) (Act guarantees employees' right to participate in collective bargaining). In 1947,
Congress amended the Act by adding provisions collectively known as the Labor Manage-
ment Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act because Congress believed the Act was too favorable
to unions. See Pub. L. No. 30-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. SS 151-87 (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Title I of the Taft Hartley Act, 5§ 101-04, amended the Act to protect
nonunion employees from union coercion. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act includes 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and is
known as the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. S 167 (1976).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) & (3) (1976) (definition of employee and employer in Act). The
Act excludes from coverage employees of either federal, state, or local governments. See
id. Many jurisdictions provide public employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through statutory enactment or judicial action. See 9 KHEEL, LABOR LAw §5 43.01
& 43.02 (1982 see also McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1968) (public
employees have constitutional rights to join, form, and assist unions). The Act also excludes
from the term "employee" any individual having the status of independent contractor,
agricultural laborer, domestic servant, supervisor, anyone employed by his parent or spouse,
an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), or anyone employed
by an individual or entity not an employer under the Act. 29 U.S.C. S 153(e) (1976).
- See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (employee rights under Act). Section 7 of the Act details
the organization and bargaining protections afforded to employees. See id. These protec-
tions include the right to join a labor organization, to bargain collectively, to engage in
other concerted activities, or to refrain from any of these activities. See id. Section 8(a)
(1) of the Act provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by interfering
with the employee rights guaranteed in S 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1)'(1976). Section 10(c)
of the Act provides authority for administrative formulation of remedies to correct employer
unfair labor practices. See 29 U.S.C. S 160(c) (1976). Note 12 infra (discussion of 5 10(c)).
See 29 U.S.C. S 153(a) (1976). The Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the resolu-
tion of all unfair labor practice cases, pre-empting any state or federal court determination
of the dispute except in matters involving collective bargaining agreements. See San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (state court jurisdiction must yield
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whether to engage in collective bargaining' by allowing a union to gain
bargaining status by majority support.' Although elections are the pre-
ferred method for determining majority sentiment,7 a union also may
qualify as exclusive bargaining agent by an employer voluntarily recogniz-
ing the union8 or by the Board issuing an order to bargain.'
The Board issues a bargaining order to secure bargaining rights for
employees when the employer engages in a campaign of coercive mis-
to Board's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices); Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers
Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1977) (Board's exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices pre-empts federal court's jurisdiction); NLRB v. George E. Light Boat Storage,
Inc., 373 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1967) (federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Board over contract disputes involving unfair labor practices).
I See 29 U.S.C. S 159(a) (1976(Act reflects congressional preference for expression of
employee sentiment through representation elections). Section 9 of the Act provides that
representatives selected for collective bargaining by the majority of a unit's employees
shall be exclusive representatives for all the employees in the unit. Id. at § 159(c) (1) (A).
' See 29 U.S.C. S 159 (1976) (outlining employee representation election procedure).
The NLRB will hold a secret ballot election if 30% or more of the employees in a relevant
work unit sign authorization cards. See id. § 159(3 (1); see also R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW-
BASIC TEXT 105-106 (1976) (discussion of authorization cards).
The Board certifies election results in accordance with S 9(c) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C.
S 159(c) (1976) (rules and regulations governing election process). A certified union has cer-
tain advantages over an uncertified union. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,
599 n.14 (1969). For example, the Board protects a certified union for 12 months against
the filing of a new election petition by a rival union, against a disruption of the bargaining
relationship because of claims that the union no longer represents a majority, and against
recognitional practices by rival unions. See id.; Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99 (1954) (cer-
tified union's majority status presumed for one year absent unusual circumstances).
' See Fraser & Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 1972) (election
is favored method to determine majority will); NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354, 366 (7th
Cir.) (primary goal of Act is employees' free choice), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971); NLRB
v. American Cable Sys. 427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir.) (industrial democracy is best method
to measure employee sentiment), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); NLRB v. Foster Co., 418
F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1969) (election preferred method to measure employee preference for
collective bargaining in absence of employer misconduct), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
' See NLRB v. A. Lasaponara & Sons, Inc., 541 F.2d 992, 995 (2d Cir. 1976) (employer's
voluntary recognition of union is binding), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 914 (1977); NLRB v. Broad
St. Hosp. and Medical Center, 452 F.2d 302, 306 (3d Cir. 1971) (voluntary recognition of
union by employer requires establishment of bargaining relationship with union); NLRB
v. San Clemente Publishing Corp., 408 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1969) (employer's voluntary
recognition of union binding on employer regardless of whether Board holds election).
' See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (bargaining order designed
to remedy past election damage; Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1346 (8th
Cir. 1978) (bargaining order is proper where employer misconduct seriously impedes elec-
tion); NLRB v. Boyer Bros., Inc., 448 F.2d 555, 561 (3d Cir. 1971) (Board may enter bargain-
ing order on basis of authorization cards), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972); see also infra
note 6 (discussion of authorization cards).
A bargaining order issued by the Board provides that the employer, upon request, engage
in collective bargaining with a particular union as the representative of a designated employee
work unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.




conduct.'" The bargaining order remedy reflects the Board's presump-
tion that extensive employer unfair labor practices may preclude the
possibility of a fair and reliable representation election." The Board reasons
that the use of ordinary remedies, such as the cease and desist order,
is inadequate to reestablish the conditions exisiting prior to the employer's
unlawful conduct." The Board therefore requires the employer to recognize
and bargain with the union to prevent the employer from profiting by
violating the Act."
11 See Grandee Beer Distrib., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 1280, .1281 (1980) (bargaining order
appropriate where employer committed series of unfair labor practices impeding union
support).
" See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 766, 768 (1977) (fair election
precluded where lingering effects of employer's misconduct are not erased easily from minds
of employees). One of the basic premises underlying administration of the Act is the Board's
special expertise to determine the effect of employer's unfair labor practices. See NLRB
v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
1' See Dadco Fashions, Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1194 (1979) (number and severity of
employer's unfair labor practices negatively impacted on employees' exercise of free choice).
The Board issues a bargaining order as a remedial device to redress unfair labor practices
committed by an employer to undermine a union's status. See id. Section 10(c) of the Act
grants the Board broad authority to formulate remedies to correct employer misconduct.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). Traditionally, the penalties imposed by the Board include orders
to cease and desist unlawful activity, the posting in the workplace of notices announcing
that the employer will cease violating the Act and refrain from such conduct in the future,
and the re-instatement of discharged employee's with backpay. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 181 (1941). Despite the broad discretion that the Act grants to the
Board, the Supreme Court has held that the penalty imposed by the Board must be remedial
rather than punitive. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940). The Court
has limited further the Board's remedial measures by denying enforcement of remedies
not tending to further the policies of the Act. See Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB,
319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
13 See Peaker Run Coal Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 93, 94 (1975) (bargaining order necessary
to prevent employer from avoiding union through campaign of coercion), cert denied, 423
U.S. 1016 (1977). The Supreme Court has stated that the Board may weigh "imponderable
subtleties" in determining the effect of employer speech on employee organizational activities.
See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941) (Board correctly decided
evidence of employer's coercion). Similarly, the Court has assumed the Board's expertise
to measure whether an employer ban on union solicitation on company premises will pre-
vent effective organization. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)
(determination of effect of employer's conduct rests with Board).
An empirical study, released in 1976 questions the Board's ability to accurately assess
the impact of either employer or union conduct. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HER.
MAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976). The study directly con-
tradicts many of the basic assumptions concerning the analysis under which the Board issues
bargaining orders. Id. at 101. For example, despite the Board's determination that an organiza-
tional campaign affects an election's outcome, the study determined that most workers have
firm opinions about whether they want a union, even before the campaign begins. Id. at
81-85. Most employees base their opinions on general attitudes about working conditions
and unions. Id. at 84. The study found that the votes of 81% of the employees votes were
predictable from pre-election attitudes and intent. Id. See generally J. Getman & S. Goldberg,
The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1972) (assumption that Board
has ability to assess impact of illegal conduct is fiction).
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Federal circuit courts normally grant the Board broad discretion to
choose remedies to correct employer unfair labor practices. 14 The stan-
dard of review applied by the courts recognizes the Board's special in-
dustrial expertise and the courts usually accept Board findings that are
reasonable.15 In reviewing bargaining order cases, however, the circuit
courts have indicated concern over the Board's failure to justify decisions
ordering an employer to bargain with a union-ather than hold a represen-
tation election. 6 The conflict between the Board and the courts has caused
substantial disagreement among the circuit courts over the correct ap-
plication of an appropriate standard of review of Board determinations
in bargaining order decisions. 7
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Company,'8 the Supreme Court examined
the standards governing the Board's use of the bargaining order remedy."
" See NLRB v. Tri-State Transp. Corp., 649 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1981) (Act grants
Board broad discretion in labor matters).
" See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951) (circuit court should
give special deference to Board's findings). The Universal Camera Court held that if the
evidence in the record as a whole, including evidence detracting from the Board's conclu-
sions, substantiates the Board's decision, an appellate court may not overrule that decision.
Id. at 497. The Universal Camera Court stated that a court should uphold the Board's find-
ings where the evidence indicates the Board decided between two fairly conflicting views.
Id. at 483. The Court reasoned that § 10(e) of the Act requires that circuit courts apply
the substantial evidence test to decisions by the Board. Id. at 477. The Board's findings
of fact are conclusive only if substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole sup-
ports the Board's conclusions. Id. at 487. The Universal Camera Court explained that the
standard of review that Congress intended appellate courts to apply to Board decisions
prevents courts from judging the sufficiency of supporting evidence without also consider-
ing the contradictory, or potentially contradictory, evidence available to the reviewing courts.
Id. at 487-88. Courts must consider all probative evidence that appears credible, even if
the Board discounted some or all of the evidence. Id. at 495-97.
" See NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110 (1978) (Board often issues bargaining
orders without adequate analysis).
"7 See infra notes and accompanying text 62 - 129 (discussion of circuit courts' disagree-
ment over Board's issuance of bargaining orders).
" 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
" Id. at 613-15. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. was a consolidation of three cases from
the Fourth Circuit and one case from the First Circuit. See Gen. Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB,
398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co. 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st
Cir. 1968). In each of the cases considered in Gissel. the employer refused to recognize unions
demanding recognition on the basis of a majority of authorization cards. 395 U.S. at 579-80.
In each case, the employer engaged in vigorous anti-union campaigns characterized by
numerous unfair labor practices. Id. at 580. The Fourth Circuit upheld the Board's unfair
labor practice determinations but denied enforcement of the Board's orders to bargain.
Id. at 585. The First Circuit enforced the Board's decision to issue a bargaining order. Id.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel, the Board imposed orders to bargain
where an employer's refusal to bargain was not justified by a good-faith doubt as to the
union's majority status. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enfd,
185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). In Joy Silk, the Board held
that an employer could reject a union's demand for recognition based on authorization cards
if the employer did so in good faith. 85 N.L.R.B. at 1263. The Joy Silk test was modified
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The Gissel Court outlined the circumstances in which the Board may order
an employer to bargain with a union instead of conducting an election
to ascertain the employees' desire to participate in collective bargaining."0
The Court discussed three categories of unfair labor practices in which
the Board may remedy employer misconduct through the use of remedial
measures.' The first category encompasses exceptional cases in which
an employer's outrageous and pervasive unfair labor practices prevent
the possibility of the Board conducting a reliable election. ' Under category
one, the Gissel Court implied in dictum that the Board may issue a bargain-
ing order without a determination of whether the union has attained
majority status. ' The Court defined category two as cases in which the
Board determines that traditional remedies will not erase the effect of
the employer's past unfair labor practices2 The Court stated that category
two includes less extraordinary cases in which the employer's misconduct
by the Board in Joseph P. Serpia, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965), rev'd sub nom., Retail Clerks
Local 1179 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1967); accord, Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B.
1007 (1966). In Joseph P. Serpia, the Board discarded the position that the employer must
carry the burden of proof in demonstrating the good-faith doubt. 155 N.L.R.B. at 100. In
oral argument before the Gissel Court, the Board abandoned the Joy Silk analysis, emphasizing
instead that the key to the issuance of a bargaining order is whether the unfair labor prac-
tices preclude the determination of employee preference through an election. 395 U.S. at
594. The Gissel Court reserved the question of whether a bargaining order may issue where
an employer refuses recognition of a union with majority card support and does not peti-
tion the Board for an election. Id. at 595. The Court later determined that a card majority
alone does not require the employer to recognize the union for collective bargaining pur-
poses. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974) (employer
not required to recognize union solely on basis of authorization cards). If an employer refuses
to recognize the union's majority status, the Board must conduct an election. Id. at 311.
See generally Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt:" The Gestalt
of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 411 (1979) (employer's
good faith doubt justifies refusal to recognize union's majority claim based on authorization
cards).
' Id. at 613.
21 Id.
2 ' Id.
I Id.; see United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n. v. N.L.R.B., 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
In United Dairy, the Third Circuit found that the Gissel decision allowed the Board to order
an employer committing egregious unfair labor practices to bargain with a labor organiza-
tion despite the union's failure to achieve a card majority or election victory. Id. at 1057.
In Gissel, the Supreme Court's opinion primarily addressed category two cases and only
briefly mentioned the guidelines governing a category one case. 395 U.S. at 615. Prior to
the United Dairy decision, the Board consistently refused to issue bargaining orders unless
the union at one time demonstrated majority support. See Fuqua Homes Missouri, Inc.,
201 N.L.R.B. 130, 131 (1973) (rejecting issuance of bargaining order absent showing of majority
support); J.P. Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 870 (1966) (refusing to issue bargaining order
without union obtaining support from majority of employees), enforced as 'modified, 380 F.2d
292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967). See generally Ostan, Bargaining Orders: Gissel
and United Dairy Farmers Revisted, 8 EAtP. REL. L.J. 198 (1982).
2 395 U.S. at 614; see supra note 12 (S 10(c) of Act gives Board broad discretion to
develop remedies to redress employer's unfair labor practices).
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tends to undermine the union's majority strength, and impede the elec-
tion process.' The Gissel Court found that in category two cases the Board
may protect employees' free choice by entering a bargaining order on the
basis of the initial card majority favoring union representation. 6 Finally,
the Gissel Court described a third category in which the employer com-
mits only minor offenses." The Court held that in category three cases
the Board should not issue a bargaining order if the employer's miscon-
duct only minimally impacts on the election process."
The circuit courts have disagreed for two reasons with the Board's
use of the bargaining order remedy since Gissel. First, the circuit courts
consistently have criticized the Board's failure to develop clear guidelines
to regulate use of the bargaining order remedy.30 Second, a number of
25 Id.
I Id. The Board issues bargaining orders in category two cases where the possibility
of eradicating the coercive effects of the employer's past misconduct is slight, and employee
sentiment is expressed best through the initial authorization card majority. See, e.g., Lud-
wig Fish & Produce, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1088 (1975) (illegal employer discharge of 40%
of bargaining unit justifies order to bargain); Montgomery Ward & Co., 220 N.L.R.B. 373,
374 (1975) (large wage increases prior to election prevent fair election); Dallas Ceramic Co.,
219 N.L.R.B. 582, 586-87 (1975) (promises by employer to correct grievances if employees
reject union renders election unreliable); Two Wheel Corp., 218 N.L.R.B. 486, 487-88 (1975)
(unlawful firings of union leaders necessitate bargaining order); Zim Textile Corp., 218
N.L.R.B. 269, 270 (1975) (bargaining order proper where employer offered benefits to
employees withdrawing support from union); Teledyne Dental Prods. Corp., 210 N.L.R.B.
435, 436 (1975) (bargaining order is correct remedy when employer suggests to employees
that direct dealing with employer to solve employee problems is more advantageous than
union representation).
395 U.S. at 615.
1 Id.; see Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B. 712, 713 (1975) (new company policy
promising employees access to top company officers not sufficiently egregious to impose
bargaining order); Sands Indus., Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 461, 470 (1975) (illegal discharge of two
employees does not warrant order to bargain); Lasco Indus., Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 527, 528
(1975) (illegal merit increases insufficient to support issuance of bargaining order); Colony
Knitwear, 217 N.L.R.B. 51, 52 (1975) (implied threats by employer do not require order to
bargain).
See generally Note, Bargaining Orders Since Gissel Packing: Time to Blow the Whis-
tle on Gissel?, 1972 WIsC. L. REV. 1170 (1972). (Board's bargaining order decisions criticized
by circuit courts).
I See Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1980 (ex-
amination of Board decisions applying Gisset reveals no consistent criteria for issuing bargain-
ing orders). Criticism of the Board for failing to articulate uniform standards controlling
issuance of bargaining orders virtually is unanimous by both courts and commentators.
See NLRB v. K&K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 469 (3d Cir. 1981) (Board engages
in speculation to find that bargaining order is appropriate); NLRB v. Matouk Indus., Inc.,
582 F.2d 125, 130 (1978) (Board has not articulated consistent standards governing issuance
of bargaining orders); see also Comment A Reappraisal of the Bargaining Order: Toward
A Consistent Application of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 69 N.W.U. L. REv. 556, 557 (1974)
(Board's post-Gissel decisions indicate absence of coherent standards governing use of bargain-
ing orders); Note, The Gissel Bargaining Order, The NLRB, and the Court of Appeals: Should
the Supreme Court Take a Second Look?, 32 S.C. L. REV. 399, 425 (1980) (Board needs stan-
dards to apply uniformly bargaining orders).
[Vol. 40:1661
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circuits also have criticized the Board's increasing tendency to impose
bargaining orders in category two cases when the employer's miscon-
duct is not so egregious as to prevent a fair election."
In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.," decided shortly after Gissel, the
Second Circuit encouraged the Board to adopt specific criteria indicating
the circumstances in which employer unfair labor practices justify a bar-
gaining order.' The General Stencils court proposed that the Board use
its rulemaking powers to formulate guidelines for issuing bargaining
orders.3 Alternatively, the Second Circuit stated that the entire Board
could join in a detailed opinion articulating the general principles con-
trolling issuance of bargaining orders. 5 The General Stencils court also
stated that the Board could explain in each case the factors precluding
a free election. 6 When the Second Circuit remanded General Stencils,
however, the Board declined to set forth any specific factors justifying
application of the bargaining order remedy.
1, NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 109 L.R.R.M. 3277,3280 (3d Cir. 1982) (Board
often issues bargaining orders routinely, Grandee Beer Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d
928, 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (court will not enforce bargaining orders where valid election is still
possible).
' 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971) (remanding 178 N.L.R.B. 108 (1969)). In NLRB v. General
Stencils, the Board supported the bargaining order by finding that the employer engaged
in a number of § 8(a) (1) violations such as interrogating employees, showing an intention
to revoke many privileges and to impose new restrictions on employees, and threatening
to close the plant in event of a union victory. 438 F.2d at 899. The Second Circuit denied
enforcement of the order to bargain because the court could not determine which of the
three Gissel categories the Board relied upon in deciding to issue a bargaining order. Id.
at 894. The court remanded the case to the Board for a determination of whether the cir-





See General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1110 (1972) (bargaining order proper
where employer unfair labor practices would prevent fair election). Chairman Miller dissented
in General Stencils and outlined several factors the Board should consider in issuing a bargain-
ing order. Id. at 1112-14 (Miller, Ch., dissenting). Miller argued that an employer grant of
significant benefits, such as wage increases to employees, and repeated employer viola-
tions of § 8(a) (3), including reassignment, demotion or discharge of union adherents, con-
stitutes sufficiently egregious conduct to allow the Board to order per se an employer to
bargain. Id at 1112. Miller also argued that the Board should adopt specific tests for deciding
whether an employer's wrongful threats actually affected the possibility of holding an un-
coerced election. Id. at 1113. First, Miller stated that the Board should consider what actions
the employer threatened to take. Id. Miller argued that the employer's threat of a plant
closure was a threat of the gravest consequence, more so than a threatened strict adherence
to work rules. Id. Second, Miller urged the Board to determine if the effect of an employer's
threat on employees was affected by the source, deliberateness, and specificity of the threat.
Id. at 1113-14. Finally, Miller argued that the Board should consider whether the employer
threats were disseminated widely. Id. at 1114. Miller reasoned that the employer threats
in General Stencils were not disseminated widely and dissented from the majority decision
to issue a bargaining order. Id
The Second Circuit again reversed the Board's decision in General Stencils and held
16671983]
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In addition to disagreeing with the Board's refusal to develop clear
bargaining order guidelines, the circuit courts have disagreed with the
Board's liberalized use of bargaining orders. 8 The courts' conflict with
the Board results from the frequency with which the Board issues bargain-
ing orders The courts warn that in many cases the Board merely recites
the employer's unfair labor practices and then states in general terms
that a coercion-free election is not possible.' In response to the courts'
perception that the Board abuses the bargaining order remedy, a majority
of the circuit courts temper the traditional deference accorded to the
Board's judgment" and require the Board to conduct a specified analysis
that the issuance of a bargaining order was incorrect. See NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.,
472 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1972) (Board arrives at conclusion not justified by fair reading
of record as whole). The Second Circuit denied enforcement, and praised Miller's attempt
to formulate workable guidelines. Id. at 171. The court stated that Miller's proposals were
superior to a case by case explication of factors precluding a fair election. Id. at 172.
1 See NLRB v. Chester Valley, Inc., 652 F.2d 263, 272 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981) (Board increas-
ingly issues bargaining orders rather than hold elections). In Chester Valley, the Second
Circuit requested the Board to document the number of cases in which the Board granted
bargaining orders rather than direct new elections. Id. The Board responded that over the
past three years, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the Board granted the General
Counsel's request for a bargaining order. Id. The court reiterated the judicial concern that
where the employer's unfair labor practices are not clearly pervasive, the Board too often
exercises its discretion in favor of a bargaining order. Id., see also Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB,
629 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Board must explain with specificity coercive im-
pact of unfair labor practices and why fair election is not possible), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
996 (1981).
See Hood, Bargaining Orders: The Effect of Gissel Packing Company, 32 LAB. L.J.
203, 207 (1980) (Board decisions indicate clear reduction in degree of misconduct necessary
to issue bargaining order). For example, Hood states that in the 1971 case Owens IGA
Foodliner, 188 N.L.R.B. 277 (1971), the Board adopted the trial examiner's finding that the
employer violated S 8(a) (1) by continued offers of wage increases and shorter hours after
notification that the employees signed union authorization cards. Hood, supra at 207. In
refusing to issue a bargaining order, the trial examiner found that the employer's single
violation did not constitute a refusal to bargain or a coercive threat. 188 N.L.R.B. at 288.
In the factually-similar 1979 decision of Pedro's Restaurant, the Board reversed itself, find-
ing that the promise of benefits to induce employees to reject union support warrants is-
suance of a bargaining order. See 246 N.L.R.B. 567, 568 (1979) enfd as modified, 652 F.2d
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Hood catalogues specific employer conduct that the Board once re-
jected as insufficient to support a bargaining order, but now finds is severe enough to war-
rant an order to bargain. Hood, supra at 204-05; see, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,
187 N.L.R.B. 956, 967 (1971) (promise of benefit); J.A. Conley Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 123, 133
(1970) (encouraging employees to vote against union); Blade Tribune Publishing Co., 180
N.L.R.B. 432, 432 (1969) (changing employees' work schedules), Arcoa Corp., 180 N.L.R.B.
1, 6 (1969) (polling employees regarding union preference); A&P Iron Works, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B.
291, 298 (1969) (recognition of rival union); Seymore Transfer, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 26, 34 (1969)
(unlawful interrogation of employees).
40 See Donn Prods. Inc. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 162, 165 (6th Cir.) (court is not required
to enforce bargaining order based on conclusory statements unsupported by facts), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491, 494 (7th Cir.
1971) (enforcement denied absent precise analysis by Board that traditional remedies will
not suffice).
" See NLRB v. Rexair, Inc., 646 F.2d 249, 250 (6th Cir. 1981) (court exercises less
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justifying the choice of a bargaining order.42 The circuit courts' specificity
requirement prevents the Board's rationale in bargaining order cases from
consisting of only a litany of employer offenses4 because the Board must
avoid use of conclusory language in assessing the impact of the employer's
misconduct." Although the exact language of the specificity requirement
varies among the circuits, the Board essentially must conduct a three-
part analysis in order to obtain enforcement of a bargaining order.45
The first component of the specificity requirement compels the Board
to make specific findings measuring the immediate and residual impact
deference to Board in bargaining order decisions); NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d
239, 242 (3d Cir. 1976) (court will scrutinize closely Board decision to issue bargaining orders);
supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (court traditionally defers to Board's expertise
in labor decisions).
See, e.g., NLRB v. Hasbro Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 978, 990 (lst Cir. 1982) (Board must
measure lingering coercive effects of company's actions); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet,
Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 840 (4th Cir. 1982) (Board's finding under Gissel must be specific and
detailed); NLRB v. Rexair, Inc., 646 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir. 1981) (Board should examine
residual impact of employer's misconduct); Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d
503, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1980) (Board should determine effect of unfair labor practices through
detailed analysis); Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1978) (Board should
examine carefully impact of employer's unlawful actions); NLRB v. Pacific S.W. Airlines,
550 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1977) (Board should measure immediate and residual impact
of unfair labor practices).
I See United Serv. for Handicapped v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 1982) (bargain-
ing order not enforced where Board's reasoning consists of a litany and recites conclusions
by rote without factual explanation); Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1016 (7th Cir.
1975) (court will not enforce Board bargaining order decisions based on conclusory statements
unsupported by sufficient facts).
" See Justak Bros. and Co. v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1981) (Board must
give sufficient reasoning to justify bargaining order and permit court to perform adequate
judicial review). In Justak, the Seventh Circuit stated that the specificity requirement was
not meant to burden the Board nor curtail the issuance of bargaining order. Id. The court
reasoned that elaborate explanations by the Board are not essential. Id. The court acknow-
ledged that scientific accuracy in estimating the impact of unfair labor practices is impossi-
ble. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the Board only must delineate the factors considered
and describe how the Board weighed these factors in deciding to issue a bargaining order.
Id.; see NLRB v. Matouk Indus., Inc., 582 F.2d 125, 130 (st Cir. 1978) (court will remand
bargaining order decisions where Board fails to support conclusions with sufficient reason-
ing); NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1976) (Board must specify
reasons leading to use of bargaining order remedy).
" See NLRB v. American Cable Sys., Inc., 414 F.2d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1969) (Board
must justify issuance of bargaining order), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 957 (1970). In American
Cable, the Fifth Circuit announced a detailed standard of review for bargaining orders that
has provided a model for other circuit courts. 414 F.2d at 668. The Fifth Circuit held that
the Board must find that the union had obtained valid authorization cards from a majority
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. Id. The court also required the Board
to find that the employer's unfair labor practices, although not outrageous and pervasive
enough to justify a bargaining order in the absence of a card majority, were still serious
and extensive. Id. at 668-69. Furthermore, the American Cable court stated that the Board
must conclude that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring
a fair election by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and employee
sentiment can best be protected in the particular case by a bargaining order. Id. at 669.
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of employer actions affecting the election process. 4 This requirement
reflects the reviewing court's concern that the administrative record must
contain sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that a bargain-
ing order is appropriate."7 The circuit courts have found the Board's failure
to determine the likelihood that the employer's unfair labor practices will
recur is fatal to a decision imposing a bargaining order.48
The second component of the specificity requirement directs the Board
to engage in a detailed analysis assessing why the employer's misconduct
precludes a reliable election and necessitates issuance of a bargaining
order. 9 The courts reason that requiring the Board to explain and defend
the use of the bargaining order remedy protects the integrity of the ad-
ministrative process by facilitating meaningful judicial review.' Requir-
ing the Board to provide analysis and findings concerning the propriety
48 See NLRB v. K&K Gourmet Meats, 640 F.2d 460, 467-70 (3d Cir. 1981) (Board must
support bargaining order with sufficient basis in fact); Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d
144, 150 (3d Cir. 1979) (Board must isolate evidence sufficiently substantial to demonstrate
that fair election is impossible).
" See NLRB v. Gilbralter Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 1981) (Board must
state sufficient basis in fact to issue bargaining order). In Gilbralter Industries, the court
restated the Sixth Circuit's position that the entry of a bargaining order is inappropriate
where the Board does not measure the residual impact, continuing effect, or likelihood of
recurrence of the employer's unfair labor practices. Id.; see NLRB v. East Side Shopper,
Inc., 498 F.2d 1334, 1336 (6th Cir. 1974) (enforcement denied where Board's support of bargain-
ing order was litany of conclusions without factual explication).
48 See Donn Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 162, 166 (6th Cir. 1980) (Board must con-
sider probability that employer's unfair labor practices will recur); NLRB v. Four Winds
Indus., 530 F.2d 75, 81 (9th Cir. 1976) (Board should consider likelihood of recurrence of
employer's misconduct).
" See NLRB v. Century Moving & Storage, Inc., 683 F.2d 1087, 1093 (7th Cir. 1982)
(application of specified analysis standard insures that Board considers whether employer's
misconduct precludes election). In Century Moving, the Seventh Circuit required the Board
to conduct "specific findings" as to the immediate and residual impact of the unfair labor
practices on the election process. Id. The court also required the Board to make a detailed
analysis assessing the possibility of holding a fair election in terms of any continuing effect
of employer misconduct, the-likelihood of recurring employer misconduct, and the potential
effectiveness of ordinary remedies. Id.; see NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100,
1103-04 (2d Cir. 1979) (bargaining order not enforced in absence of express consideration
by Board of factors precluding preferred election remedy); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co.,
494 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1974) (Board must make proper findings to support decision that
only bargaining order will remedy unfair labor practices).
I See NLRB v. Armcor Indus., 535 F.2d 234, 245 (3d Cir. 1974) (specificity requirement
prevents abuse of administrative process). In Armcor Industries, the Third Circuit stated
that the fundamental reason supporting the specificity requirement is that the Board must
make sufficient findings to permit the court to perform informed judicial review of the
Board's bargaining orders. Id. Other courts repeatedly have sounded a similar theme in
requiring the Board to comply with the specificity standard. See Grandee Beer Dist., Inc.
v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1980) (Board's inadequate analysis prevents court of
appeals from performing its statutory review obligations); First Lakewood Assoc. v. NLRB,




of a bargaining order also protects against the arbitrary exercise of the
Board's power.5'
The specificity requirement's third component insures that the Board
must consider similar bargaining order cases in which the Board decided
not to order the employer to bargain.2 The courts find that requiring the
Board to distinguish factually similar cases contributes to the growth and
predictability of the Board's use of the bargaining order remedy.' The.
courts reason that the Board's broad discretion to remedy employer
misconduct does not allow the Board to issue bargaining orders in a ran-
dom or inconsistent manner."
The circuit courts' adoption of the specificity requirement, however,
has not resulted in a consistent review of bargaining order decisions.55
Circuit courts continue to disagree over whether the Board's analysis is
sufficient to meet the standard mandated by the specificity requirement.-
Disagreement among the circuit courts results from the apparent contradic-
tion between the bargaining order's twin goals of preventing employer
misconduct and effectuating employee free choice.57 Although an order
to bargain may deter an employer from violating the Act, issuance of a
bargaining order in the absence of an election also may impinge on
1, See NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling Co., 558 F.2d 160, 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (specifici-
ty standard provides protection against arbitrary exercise of Board's power).
11 See Peerless of America v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1119 (5th Cir. 1973) (Board failed
to distinguish similar cases where bargaining orders were not issued). In Peerless, the Fifth
Circuit admonished the Board for not distinguishing prior decisions where employer threats
were equally serious if not far more serious to the election process. Id. The court held
that absent any self-evident basis for differentiation, the reviewing court cannot respon-
sibly guard against administrative excess unless the Board explains in what respects one
case differs from another. Id.
I See Chromalloy Mining and Minerals v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1129 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Board's reconciliation of contrary results in bargaining order cases contributes to stability
of labor law).
See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1979) (Board's broad
discretion does not allow inconsistent rulings). In Jamaica Towing, the Board reversed the
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision not to issue a bargaining order. Id. at 1104.
The Second Circuit reasoned that requiring the Board to reconcile other inconsistent deci-
sions is paramount in cases where the Board overturns the ALJ's finding. Id. The court
stated that inconsistencies in bargaining order case law give the impression that the Board
is making ad hoc decisions. Id. at 1105. The court held that the Board's wide discretion
in choosing remedies does not override the correlative duty to explain the use of the bargain-
ing order in one case, and the failure to do so in a factually similar case. Id.
I See infra notes 63-98 and accompanying text (discussion of Third and Fourth Cir-
cuits' inconsistent application of specificity requirement).
Compare NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(Board's finding sufficient to meet specificity requirement) with Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB,
558 F.2d 1137,1139 (3d Cir. 1977) (bargaining order not enforced where Board's justification
insufficient to comply with specificity requirement).
51 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (effectuating free choice
becomes as important as deterring employer misconduct); see infra notes 152-57 and
accompanying text (discussion of bargaining orders dual goals).
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employees' right to reject collective bargaining.5 In applying the specificity
requirement, courts that emphasize the deterrence of employer
misbehavior may attain a result contrary to courts that emphasize whether
the Board considered the possibility of holding an election.5 1 Courts focus-
ing the analysis on one goal to the exclusion of another frequently reach
different conclusions in similar cases." A survey of circuit court decisions
indicates that courts' failure to develop and apply a consistent standard
of review to determine whether the Board's issuance of a bargaining order
conforms to the standards announced in Gissel.'
The Third Circuit is divided over a court's proper role in reviewing
bargaining order decisions.2 In NLRB v. K&K Gourmet Meats, Inc.,' the
Third Circuit refused to enforce the Board's finding that a bargaining order
was necessary to redress the employer's unfair labor practices." The court
stated that the bargaining order is an extraordinary remedy operating
to disenfranchise workers in the choice of their representative. 5 The
Gourmet Meats court held that a bargaining order is appropriate only when
the positive advancement of the policies underlying federal labor law
outweigh the effects of disenfranchisement.6 The Third Circuit's analysis
centered on whether the effect of the employer's illegal conduct
necessitated issuance of a bargaining order. 7 The court found that the
I See NLRB v. National Car Rentals Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1182, 1190 (3d Cir. 1982) (Board's
bargaining order may impose a bargaining representative on employees not desiring collec-
tive bargaining). In National Car Rental, the Third Circuit stated that the Board failed
to recognize the injustice in imposing a bargaining order on employees who are perfectly
able to decide whether they want representation by a union. Id. at 1191. The court held
that the injury which might occur to the rights of the employees by imposing on them
a union they might not want is much greater than injury occurring by allowing the employer
to avoid a unionized work force. Id.
" See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussion of courts which vary
emphasis between deterring employer misconduct and effectuating employee free choice).
See Note, The Gissel Bargaining Order, the NLRB, and the Courts ofAppeals:-Should
the Supreme Court Take a Second Look?, 32 S.C. L. REv. 399, 402-403 (1980) (emphasizing
one goal over another alters analysis required to determine whether bargaining order is
appropriate).
6, See infra notes 62-129 and accompanying text (discussion of courts' failure to apply
consistent standard of review in bargaining order cases).
6" See generally Comment, Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Orders in the Third
Circuit: The Rise and Fall of the Armcor Standards, 25 VILL. L. REV. 913 (1980) (discussion
of Third Circuit bargaining order cases).
' 640 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1981). In NLRB v. Gourmet Meats, the Third Circuit rejected
the Board's finding of several S 8(a)(1) violations by the employer, including interrogation
of an employee by a supervisor and an implied promise by the company president to con-
sider employee complaints. Id. at 465. The court, however, decided that the evidence was
sufficient to justify the Board's finding that both a supervisor and the company president
committed unfair labor practices by promising employee benefits in exchange for defeat




6 Id. at 469-70.
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Board's traditional remedies were sufficient to ensure a fair determina-
tion of employee sentiment."8 The Gourmet Foods dissent criticized the
majority's opinion as indicative of the "guerilla warfare" used by a minority
of judges in the Third Circuit against bargaining orders. 9 The dissent
explained that in prior Third Circuit decisions, the court often imposed
the specificity requirement to deny enforcement of bargaining orders on
the grounds that adequate review was not possible." The dissent argued
that in Gourmet Meats, the majority simply substituted the court's judg-
ment for that of the Board.' The dissent contended that, given the
majority's holding, court enforcement of bargaining orders was doubtful
under any circumstances.
2
In contrast to the court in Gourmet Meats, the Third Circuit in NLRB
v. Permanent Label Corp."3 emphasized the deterrence of employer miscon-
I Id. In Gourmet Meats, the Third Circuit found that the record indicated that the
employees were unimpressed with the employer's promise of benefits. Id. at 470. The court
reasoned that where employees do not believe an employer's unlawful promise, traditional
remedies adequately correct the effect of the employer's illegal practice. Id. But see United
Oil Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 1208, 1211 (3d Cir. 1982). In United Oil, the Third Circuit
agreed with the Board's finding that seven of the 29 employees in the unit were affected
directly by the employer's illegal conduct, either as the targets of interrogation, the reci-
pients of promotion and wage increases, or the victims of denied overtime benefits. 672
F.2d at 1212. The court distinguished the Gourmet Meats decision, however, stating that
in Gourmet Meats the ALJ characterized the employer misconduct as "minimal," while the
ALJ in United Oil termed the employer's unfair labor practices as "serious." Id. at 1213.
The United Oil court agreed with the ALJ's description and enforced the Board's bargain-
ing order. Id. at 1214. The United Oil dissent asserted that Gourmet Meats controlled. Id.
at 1215 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting). The dissent found that the ALJ's description of the
employer's unlawful conduct was not the primary consideration. Id. at 1218. The dissent
argued that a Gissel order is not appropriate given serious unfair labor practices, but rather
an order may issue only upon a finding that the possibility of a fair election is slight. Id.
1 640 F.2d at 471; see NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
3277, 3282 (3d Cir. 1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (aggressive minority of judicial activists
in Third Circuit continues with ingenuity to strike down bargaining orders).
640 F.2d at 471.
-n Id.
I Id. at 473.
7 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). In NLRB v. Permanent Label, Corp., the Third
Circuit affirmed the Board's findings of multiple unfair labor practices, including unlawful
retaliatory suspensions of employees because of their union support. Id. at 517. In enforc-
ing the ALJ's determination that a bargaining order was necessary, the Board did not pro-
vide a separate articulation of the reasons for imposing the order. Id. at 519. Previously,
the Third Circuit had required that the Board, in addition to adopting the ALJ's findings,
independently make the necessary findings to support a bargaining order. See Hedstrom
Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137, 1146 (3d Cir. 1977) (Board has not made detailed analysis of
lingering effects of employer's unfair labor practices). Following the Supreme Court's ad-
monition in Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978), that reviewing courts should leave administrative agencies free
to establish procedures for deciding matters within their scope of authority, the Third Circuit
abandoned its demand for additional Board elaboration concerning the propriety of a bargain-
ing order. See Kentworth Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 62 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Ver-
mont Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. at 525).
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duct and enforced the Board's decision to issue a bargaining order. 4 The
Permanent Label court's analysis focused on the severity of the employer's
unfair labor practices, rather than on the reasons why a fair election was
impossible."5 The court found that the Board correctly complied with the
specificity requirement by concluding that the employer's violations were
widespread and that the employer would violate the Act to resist
unionization. 6 The dissent in Permanent Label argued that the Board did
not satisfy the specificity requirement.77 The dissent stated that under
a category two inquiry, the Gissel Court required a determination that
the employer's conduct impedes the election process." The dissent also
argued that the Board's analysis circumvented the specificity requirement
by failing to address whether the employer's unfair labor practices would
recur. 9 The dissent contended that the Board did not meet the reviewing
standard by stating only the magnitude of the employer's unfair labor
practices while not estimating the misconduct's coercive impact on the
employees.' The dissent further contended that the Board did not appraise
adequately the factors preventing a fair election'
The Fourth Circuit has emphasized both the protection of employee
free choice and the deterrence of illegal employer actions in applying the
specificity requirement to bargaining order decisions.' In NLRB v. Apple
Tree Chevrolet, Inc.,' the Fourth Circuit held that to obtain enforcement
' 657 F.2d at 521.
7 Id. at 520-21.
78 See Id. at 520. The Permanent Label court enforced the bargaining order and held
that the specificity requirement did not require the ALJ to state specifically the inference
drawn from each factor cited in support of the bargaining order. Id. at 521. The court stated
that requiring stated inferences by the Board would elevate form over substance and overstep
the appropriate limits of judicial review. Id.
Judge Aldisert, in a concurrence, criticized the majority's application of the specificity
requirement. Id. at 522. Judge Aldisert argued that the specificity requirement allowed
appeals courts to impose their own judgments on the Board under the guise of reviewing
the Board's basis for imposing an order to bargain. Id. at 524-27. Judge Aldisert also argued
that the rule reflected a hostility to Gissel orders in general and the competence of ALJ's
in particular. Id. at 526-27. Judge Aldisert contended that the court would continue to divide
as long as opinions differed over the application of the rule. Id. at 521.
T, Id. at 529. The Permanent Label dissent asserted that virtually the entire thrust
of the ALJ's discussion focused not on the reasons why a free election was impossible,
but instead on the reasons why the employer's misconduct invalidated the prior election.
Id. at 532.
78 Id. at 534-35.
" Id. at 533.
80 Id. at 533-34.
81 Id. The Permanent Label dissent argued that the Board in reviewing the ALJ's deci-
sion should have considered such factors as the closeness of the vote, the change in com-
position of the workforce, the effect of the passage of time, the probability of repeated
employer violations and the effectiveness of traditional remedies. Id. at 534.
" See supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (courts which vary emphasis between deter-
ring employer misconduct and effectuating employee free choice may reach contrary results).
' 671 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1982). In NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., the Board peti-
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of a bargaining order, the Board must advance specific, detailed reasons
why an election will not reflect employee preferences fairly.' In refusing
enforcement of the bargaining order, the court stated that the Board did
not consider whether the employer's conduct would continue in the future
or whether traditional remedies would erase the coercion resulting from
the employer's prior misconduct.85
The Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Maidsville Coal Company, Inc.,86
criticized the Board for failing to examine the possibility of conducting
a fair electionY The court stated that under a category two analysis, Gissel
requires the Board to consider why traditional remedies will not erase
the damage occasioned by the employer's unfair labor practices.8 The
Maidsville Coal court reasoned that the specificity requirement directs
the Board to consider whether the employer misconduct precluded a fair
election.!' The court held that the Board's conclusory language justifying
the bargaining order was insufficient to meet the Apple Tree Chevrolet
standard and denied enforcement of the order."
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn
Division, Inc. v. NLRB' indicates that the court will not require the Board
to emphasize consistently the protection of employee free choice.2 The
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher court stated that deference to the Board's judg-
ment is appropriate unless the Board's decision rests on insubstantial
tioned the Fourth Circuit a second time for enforcement of a bargaining order. Id. at 839.
Previously, the Fourth Circuit denied enforcement, remanding the case to the Board for
reconsideration of the bargaining order. See NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 608 F.2d
988 (4th Cir. 1979) (Board directed to consider bargaining order's propriety after court upheld
employer's discharge of four employees as lawful).
671 F.2d at 840.
Id. at 841. The Apple Tree Chevrolet court distinguished the Fourth Circuit's prior
decision in J.P. Stevens & Co., Ina. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 767 (4th Cir. 1982); see 671 F.2d at
841. The J.P. Stevens court found little evidence to indicate that conventional Board remedies
effectively would redress the effects of the employer's multiple unfair labor practices. 668
F.2d at 773. Moreover, the J.P. Stevens court held that the past history and recent conduct
of Stevens suggested that the employer would likely ignore all Board remedies except a
bargaining order. Id. In contrast, the Apple Tree Chevrolet court found no evidence that
the Board's ordinary cease and desist order would not suffice to insure an untainted elec-
tion. 671 F.2d at 841.
' 693 F.2d at 1119 (4th Cir. 1982). In NLRB v. Maidsville Coal, I=., the Board held
that the employer committed § 8(a)(1) violations by unlawfully interrogating employees and
by threats of employee discharges, as well as § 8(a)(3) violations by illegally discharging
employees. Id. at 1120.
In Id. at 1121.
a Id.
Id. at 1122.
': Id. at 1123.
" 691 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1982). In Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Div. Inc. v.
NLRB, the Board found that the employer unlawfully responded to a union campaign with
threats of plant closure, threats of retaliation against union activists, and discriminatory
discipline aimed at thwarting unionization. Id. at 1144.
K Id.
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evidence or erroneous legal standards and constitutes an abuse of
discretion." The court reasoned that the ultimate choice of an appropriate
remedy remains within the providence of the Board. 4 The court found
that the Board's conclusions were reasonable and enforced the Board's
decision to issue a bargaining order. 5 The dissent in Standard-Coosa-
Thatcher criticized the majority's departure from the prior application of
the specificity requirement in Apple Tree Chevrolet and Maidsville Coal."
The dissent contended that the majority's emphasis on employer miscon-
duct altered the specificity requirement's essential analysis that requires
the Board to demonstrate why traditional remedies are inappropriate. 7
The dissent argued that under a proper application of the specificity re-
quirement, the Board failed to meet the burden of proving that a fair elec-
tion was not possible.
The Seventh Circuit enforces bargaining orders only when the Board
considers the possibility of holding a fair election.9 The Seventh Circuit
holds that in the absence of express consideration by the Board of the
propriety of a bargaining order, a court should presume that an election
is the preferred means of determining representative status.'9 In Justak
Brothers & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, °10 the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's
decision to issue a bargaining order, ruling that the Board's findings suf-
93 Id.
"' Id. The Standard-Coosa-Thatcher court found that the employer's conduct tended
"to have a lasting inhibitive effect" on employees' formulation and expression of free choice
regarding unionization. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 632 F.2d 208, 213 (2d
Cir. 1980)). The Fourth Circuit therefore decided that a Gissel order was appropriate unless
a very strong showing negates the inference of lasting effects. Id. at 1144.
"' Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1145 (Bryan, J., dissenting). Judge Bryan wrote the dissent in Maidsville Coal
and authored the majority opinion in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher. See supra notes 86-90 and
accompanying text (discussion of Maidsville Coal).
691 F.2d at 1146.
"Id.
See Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1980). In Red
Oaks, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the principle that when the Board fails to make detailed
findings justifying a bargaining order, the court will favor elections as the preferred means
of determining whether the employees desire to enter into collective bargaining. Id. at 507-09;
see also Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1122 (7th Cir. 1973) (Board's
findings insufficient to warrant choice of bargaining order over new election). The Red Oaks
court declined to view the Board's failure to develop workable bargaining order guidelines
as the results of a flagrant disregard for their duties under the law. 633 F.2d at 509. Rather,
the court stated that the Board should follow the legal principle preferring elections and
presume that the necessary requirements for a bargaining order are not present. Id.
" See First Lakewood Assoc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1978) (Board must
appraise factors reasonably bearing on potential curative effect of ordinary remedies).
101 664 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1981). In Justak Brothers & Co. v. NLRB, the court upheld
the Board's findings that an employer engaged in surveillance of union activities, discharged
union supporters, threatened layoffs and immigration investigations, and promised employees
additional benefits to thwart unionization. Id. at 1082.
"I Id. at 1081.
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ficiently complied with the specificity requirement.1 2 The court reasoned
that the Boaid adequately considered the remedial value of traditional
remedies in measuring the impact of the employer's misconduct on the
election process."3 The court affirmed the Board's finding that the
employer's systematic campaign of unfair labor practices prevented the
possibility of determining employee sentiment through a reliable election.'
In NLRB v. Century Moving & Storage, fnw., 05 the Seventh Circuit
denied enforcement of a bargaining order where mitigating evidence, such
as the absence of any antiunion animus on the part of the employer, re-
duced the impact of the misconduct.' 0 The court stated that the Board's
critical inquiry under the specificity requirement is whether a valid elec-
tion was precluded because of the employer's unlawful actions.' The court
found that since the employer did not have a history of previous viola-
tions, recurrence of the employer misconduct was doubtful and traditional
remedies would allow a coercion-free election."0 8
The First Circuit has expressed dissatisfaction with the Board's failure
to comply with the specificity requirement by refusing to remand Board
decisions that fail to make the necessary analysis."9 In NLRB v. American
" Id. at 1088.
104 I1&
I's 683 F.2d 1087 (7th Cir. 1982). In NLRB v. Century Moving & Storage, Inc., the Board
found that the employer's unfair labor practices consisted of coercive employee interroga-
tion, an unlawful promise of wage increases, and layoffs motivated by anti-union considera-
tions. Id. at 1088.
' Id. at 1093-94.
Io, d. at 1093. z
.0 Id. In Century Moving, the court stated that although the employer's misconduct
was too severe to fall within the third Gissel category, the misconduct was not sufficient
to support imposing a category one bargaining order. Id. at 1093-94. The court determined
that under a category two analysis the bargaining order was inappropriate since the Board's
traditional remedies were sufficient to mitigate the employer's unlawful acitvity. Id.
The Sixth Circuit generally focuses the specificity analysis in terms of whether a fair
election is possible. See, e.g., NLRB v. Frederic's Foodland, Inc., 655 F.2d 88, 90 (6th Cir.
1982) (bargaining order not appropriate where unfair labor practices would not in court's
opinion prevent fair election); NLRB v. Arrow Molded Plastics, Inc., 653 F.2d 280, 284 (6th
Cir. 1981) (bargaining order not enforced where effect of unfair labor practices quickly
dissipated); NLRB v. Gilbraltar Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 1981) (election
remains preferred method of determining employee choice); NLRB v. Rexair, Inc., 646 F.2d
249, 250 (6th Cir. 1981) (court exercises less deference and scrutinizes Board more closely
where bargaining order is imposed without holding election). In two recent Sixth Circuit
decisions, however, the court approved category two bargaining orders issued by the Board
without requiring the Board to comply with the specificity requirement. See Stanley M.
Feil, Inc. v. NLRB, 674 F.2d 567, 568 (6th Cir. 1982) (Board order to bargain supported
by substantial evidence); NLRB v. Industry Prods. Co., 673 F.2d 164, 165 (6th Cir. 1982)
(Board did not abuse authority in issuing bargaining order).
'" See NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 120 ast Cir. 1978) (court may analyze
record to determine propriety of bargaining order when Board's findings are inadequate).
In Pilgrim Foods, the court relied upon the Gissel Court's warning that a bargaining order
should not issue when the impact of the unfair labor practices is minimal. Id. at 120. The
First Circuit stated that remand to the Board was improper when the court's review of
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Spring Bed Manufacturing Co.,11 the First Circuit denied enforcement of
a bargaining order because the Board's decision did not explain why the
employer's illegal conduct would impede a valid election."' Rather than
remand the case to the Board for clarification, the First Circuit examined
the entire record and found that traditional remedies would insure a fair
election."'
In NLRB v. Amber Delivery Service, Inc., the First Circuit ignored
the Gissel Court's warning that the Board primarily is responsible for
determining whether or not to issue a bargaining order."1 In Amber
Delivery, the First Circuit did not challenge the sufficiency of the Board's
justification for the bargaining order, but disagreed with the Board's con-
clusions concerning the impact of the employer's misconduct." The court
dismissed the Board's contention that the employer's unlawful statements
concerning the union and illegal changes in working conditions justified
issuance of a bargaining order.1 6 The First Circuit found the employer's
the record indicated that the employer's unfair labor practices fell within the third Gissel
category. Id.
110 670 F.2d 1236 (st Cir. 1982). In NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., the Board
found that the union represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. Id.
at 1246. Although the company claimed it had a good faith doubt in rejecting a union claim
for recognition, the Board rejected the Company's defense. The Board instead found that
the company, while refusing to bargain, also engaged in a series of unfair labor practices
violative of § 8(a) (1) and (3). Id. The Board held that the employer's miconduct provided
requisite proof of a S 8(a) (5) violation. Id. The First Circuit held in American Spring Bed
that when a union makes a showing of a valid card majority, a determination of whether
a S 8(a) (5) violation was committed requires essentially the same analysis as whether a
bargaining order should issue. Id. at 1247; see First Lakewood Assoc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
416, 422 (7th Cir. 1978) (analysis of S 8(a) (5) and bargaining order issue is similar).
"' 670 F.2d at 1248. In American Spring Bed, the Board found that the company's un-
fair labor practices consisted of an illegal wage increase, the termination of two employees
for union activities and a threat to an employee based on anti-union animus. Id. at 1242-44.
The court held that the company's illegal wage increase neither intimidated nor coerced
employees in relation to their ability to make a free choice in electing a union represen-
tative. Id.
12 Id. at 1248. The American Spring Bed court stated the judicial concern that remand
to the Board results in inefficiency and exacerbates the Board's administrative burden.
Id. After analyzing the record, the First Circuit vacated the bargaining order, ruling in-
stead that a cease and desist order would sufficiently erase the effects of the employer's
misconduct and allow the Board to hold a fair election. Id. at 1243-49.
,"3 651 F.2d 57 (1st Cir. 1981). In NLRB v. Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., the Board held
that the employer committed unfair labor practices by impermissibly interrogating and
soliciting help from employees, by imposing suspensions on employees in retaliation for
union activities, and by instituting changes in working conditions in an unlawful attempt
to convert employees into independent contractors thereby depriving them of the statutory
right to union representation. Id. at 58; see supra note 3 (Act excludes independent
contractors).





election misconduct minimal and the employer's past behavior suggested
recurrence of the unlawful activity was unlikely."1
Although the majority of circuit courts have adopted the specificity
requirement, the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eighth Circuit still
defer to the Board's determination of the propriety of a bargaining order.118
In John Cuneo, Inc. v. NLRB,"' the District of Columbia Circuit held that
the court would enforce a decision to issue a bargaining order unless the
Board abused its remedial discretion.10 The court found that the Board's
recital of a litany of the employer's unfair labor practices supported
issuance of a bargaining order. 2' The court reasoned that the employer's
misconduct indicated a pattern of conduct designed to stifle further union
activity." The court stated that the Gissel Court did not require that the
Board find that only a bargaining order would suffice." Instead, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the Board merely must find that
a bargaining order better protects employees' expressed union
preference."4
The Eighth Circuit, which traditionally refused to apply the specifi-
city requirement in reviewing bargaining order decisions,"' rejected en-
.,7 Id. at 70.
I" See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Board has broad authority to issue bargaining orders), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
In Clothing Workers, the employer violated the Act by unlawful pre-election conduct in-
cluding coercive threats, promises of benefits and changes in employment conditions. Id.
at 807. The District of Columbia Circuit court stated the majority view requiring the Board
to support the bargaining order with detailed findings, but then deferred to the Board's
expertise in upholding the order to bargain. Id. at 808.
119 681 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3550 (Jan. 25, 1983). In John
Cuneo, Inc. v. NLRB, the court affirmed both the Board's unfair labor practice findings
and the Board's determination that it was justified in making the bargaining order retro-
active to the date on which the company rejected the union's lawful demand for recognition
and embarked on the course of unlawful conduct. Id. at 12.
12 Id. at 23.
12 Id. at 24. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in John Cuneo, two justices
dissented from the denial. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3550 (Jan. 25, 1983). Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justice Powell, took exception to the District of Columbia's approval of the bargaining
order in two respects. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated that the court in John Cuneo focused
on the type of practice committed, rather than the extent to which the practices occcurred.
Id. Justice Rehnquist argued that the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis could find any
type of unfair labor practice rising to the level of misconduct contemplated by Gissel if
committed with sufficient frequency. Id. Justice Rehnquist also stated the Gissel Court's
warning that bargaining orders never were intended to be issued routinely. Id. Since the
District of Columbia sanctioned the bargaining order without a finding that the special
circumstances required by Gissel existed, Justice Rehnquist argued that the Supreme Court
should review the order. Id.
'= 681 F.2d at 23.
' I/d.
Id. at 24.
'= See Abie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1971) (court should
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forcement of a bargaining order in Patsy Bee, Inc. v. NLRB 126 because the
Board offered only conclusory language stating that the possibility of a
fair election was minimal." The court held that in the absence of substan-
tial evidence indicating that the employer's conduct impeded the election
process, the Board abused its discretion by issuing a bargaining order."
Although the Patsy Bee court did not explicitly adopt the specificity re-
quirement, the court employed the same analysis in rejecting the Board's
order to bargain. 29 The court found that the employer's unfair labor prac-
tices only were isolated incidents that produced little impact on the
employee's allegiance to the union. 130
The disparate results in bargaining order cases reflect the Board's
failure to develop controlling bargaining order guidelines' and the cir-
cuit courts' inability to apply a consistent analysis in reviewing such
orders.'32 The Board's basis for issuing bargaining orders rests upon its
special expertise in determining the coercive impact of employer
misconduct. 3' The Board undermines its expertise regarding employee
behavior by failing to articulate the reasons justifying a decision to issue
a bargaining order."4 The circuit courts repeatedly have questioned the
Board's credibility by rejecting the Board's conclusions concerning the
impact of employer misconduct."= The courts' reluctance to enforce bargain-
ing order decisions reflects the courts' implicit recognition that not only
has the Board applied the bargaining order in an arbitrary manner," but
defer to Board's exercise of discretion when record is silent concerning actual impact of
employer's unfair labor practices).
"' 654 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981). In Patsy Bee, Inc. v. NLRB, the court rejected the Board's
finding that the company president threatened the closing of the plant if the employees
voted for the union. Id. at 518. The court found that the three remaining unfair labor prac-
tices had no significant effect on union strength. Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
" Id. In rejecting the Board's issuance of the bargaining order, the Patsy Bee court
found that the Board offered no support for the order other than a conclusory statement
that the odds for a free choice in a rerun election were minimal. Id.
130 Id.
... See supra noted 32 - 37 and accompanying text (discussion of Board's refusal to develop
bargaining order guidelines).
132 See supra notes 62 - 129 and accompanying text (discussion of circuit courts' failure
to apply a consistent standard of review).
"3 See J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 767,774 (4th Cir. 1982) (courts recognize
Board's expertise in fashioning remedies); see also supra notes 14 - 17 and accompanying
text (courts defer to Board's expertise in labor matters).
" See NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 119 (st Cir. 1978) (First Circuit shares
concern of other circuits that Board issues bargaining orders without adequately explain-
ing reasons).
'"' See Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1120 (7th Cir. 1973) (current
Board assumptions concerning impact of employer misconduct are questionable).
"' See NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3280 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1982) (limitations and issued bargaining orders in cases when such action clearly was
not warranted).
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empirical evidence directly contradicts many of the Board's basic
assumptions.137 The courts' criticism of the Board has not abated the con-
troversy which surrounds decisions issuing an order to bargain.'38 The
Board continues to issue bargaining orders without clear standards to
guide application of the remedy."9
The increased use of bargaining orders has heightened the Board's
conflict with the circuit courts over the correct interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gissel.4 ° The Board's policy concerning
bargaining orders relies upon the Gissel Court's finding that a bargaining
order may issue if the remedy better protects employees' expressed union
preference.' The Board reasons that the Gissel Court granted the Board
broad discretion to determine whether to use traditional remedies or issue
a bargaining order.' The circuit courts, however, have exercised less
deference to the Board when the Board imposes bargaining orders without
determining whether the employer's unfair labor practices precluded a
reliable election.' The courts' interpretation of Gissel rejects the premise
that the Board may balance whether traditional remedies or a bargaining
order best protect employee choice.' Instead, courts applying the spec-
" See supra note 12 J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN (empirical study contradicts
many of Board's basic assumptions concerning impact of employer's unfair labor practices).
Commentators repeatedly have criticized the Board's lack of expertise respecting voter
behavior. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma under the Ad-
ministrative Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 577-78 (1970) (Board lacks specific information about
labor-management practices and employee attitudes and reactions); Bok, The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 46-53, 88-90 (1968) (one may be justly skeptical of Board's expertise
concerning effect of employer conduct); Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Ex-
pertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REV 681, 683 (1972) (Board's experience does not insure accuracy in
its assumptions); Samoff, NLRB Elections, Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
228, 252 (1968) (Board should deliberately refrain from deciding impact of employer cam-
paign tactics); Note, Behavioral and Non-Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation
Cases, 45 IND. L.J. 276, 278 (1970) (Board should articulate evidence supporting behavior
conclusions or abandon present approach). See generally Lewis, Gissel Packing: Was the
Supreme Court Right? 56 A.B.A.J. 877 (1970); Pogrebin, NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel:
Wandering From a Landmark, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 193 (1971).
'8 See NLRB v. Gibralter Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 1091, 1099 (6th Cir. 1981) (Board's order
to bargain not in accordance with purposes of Act).
" See NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 1972) (Board issues bargain-
ing orders without adequate reasoning); NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 244
(3d Cir. 1976) (rule requiring Board to set forth reasoned analysis justifying bargaining order
under Gissel is salutary).
" See NLRB v. Chester Valley, Inc., 652 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1981) (circuit courts
note the increasing number of bargaining orders issued by Board).
... 395 U.S. at 614-615.
"' See John Cuneo, Inc. v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Gissel directs courts
to allow Board discretion in deciding if bargaining order better protects employees' union
preferences).
1" See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (courts deference to board lessened
in review of bargaining order decisions).
' See NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1248 Ust Cir. 1982) (elec-
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ificity requirement hold that Gissel requires the Board expressly to con-
sider the impact of the employer's misconduct on the election process.
1 5
The specificity requirement originated from the courts' concern that the
Board often mechanically concluded that a bargaining order was the pro-
per remedy.'" The specificity requirement attempts to insure that the
Board comply with the Gissel Court's rationale and not arbitrarily impose
bargaining orders. " 7 The circuit courts' continued division between
emphasizing the need to focus on deterring employer misconduct and em-
phasizing the need to protect employees' freedom of choice, however, only
exacerbates the uncertainty surrounding the proper use of the bargain-
ing order remedy.'
The circuit courts' split over the proper application of the specificity
requirement has significant practical ramifications for employers. Although
the courts normally defer to the Board's judgment, employers appealing
orders to bargain may find a reviewing court more receptive to an
employer's argument that the Board abused its discretion.' The
employer's probability of successfully challenging the Board's order will
depend on which circuit court reviews the decision." ° Circuit courts
applying the specificity requirement closely scrutinize the Board's rationale
supporting a bargaining order, thus allowing the employer greater
opportunity to attack the Board's reasoning and conclusions."' The
employer's likelihood of winning an appeal of a Board decision ultimately
may depend on a showing that a fair election to determine the employees'
sentiment concerning unionization is still a viable possibility."
The philosopical differences among the circuit courts reflect the in-
herent difficulty in balancing the courts' limited role in reviewing ad-
tion is preferred method of determining bargaining unit's representative and bargaining
order appropriate only when fair election not possible).
141 See NLRB v. K&K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 469 (3d Cir. 1981) (bargaining
order appropriate where employer's misconduct coerces employees and prevents fair election).
141 See NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 496 F.2d 862, 863 (6th Cir. 1972) (Board's reasoning
consists only of conclusions without factual explication).
17 See supra notes 49 - 51 and accompanying text (specificity requirement protects against
arbitrary application by Board).
"8 See NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 522 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J.,
concurring) (specificity requirement has failed to add predictability and stability to bargaining
order law); see also supra note 76 (discussion of Judge Aldisert's concurrence in Permanent
Label).
19 See NLRB v. Keystone Pretzel Bakery, Inc., 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3277, 3280 (3d Cir.
1982) (courts should not defer readily to Board's often questionable expertise by not requir-
ing that substantial evidence support agency adjudication).
'" See NLRB v. K&K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (Third Circuit decisions indicate that certain judges have signalled Board
that bargaining orders are unwelcome in Third Circuit).
1, See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (circuit courts exercise less deference
to bargaining order decisions).
1 2 See NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841 n.5 (4th Cir. 1982) (court
will not enforce bargaining orders where valid election still is possible).
[Vol. 40:1661
BARGAINING ORDERS
ministrative actions with the judicial responsibility to restrain the Board
within the broad policies established by Congress in the Act."' A proper
application of the specificity requirement recognizes the policy distinc-
tions between the two categories of bargaining order cases discussed by
the Gissel Court.' In category one, the Gissel Court implied that egregious
employer misconduct may allow the Board to order an employer to bargain
with a union without a determination of majority sentiment." The Court's
language indicates that deterring employer misconduct is the primary
policy behind category one.1 51 Category two modifies the attention placed
on deterring employer violations by directing the Board to give equal em-
phasis to effectuating employee free choice.
1 57
The Gissel Court's admonition that protecting employee free choice
is an equal policy consideration is implemented fully only when the Board
expressly considers whether traditional remedies will permit an unbiased
election." The Third Circuit in Gourmet Meats recognized that a proper
application of the specificity requirement compels the Board to determine
the coercive impact of an employer's misconduct on affected employees.'59
The Gourmet Meats court correctly reasoned that requiring the Board to
make detailed findings concerning the effectiveness of traditional remedies
effectively reinforces the principle that a representation election is
preferable to a bargaining order.6 The Third Circuit's decision in Perma-
nent Label illustrates a different application of the specificity requirement
which permits the Board to emphasize unduly the severity of the
employer's misconduct. 6 In Permanent Label, the majority's decision
allowed the Board to refrain from specifically measuring the effect of the
employer's unfair labor practices.2 The court enforced the bargaining
order decision despite the Board's failure to determine properly whether
a fair election still was possible. The Permanent Label court's rationale
undermines the purpose of the specificity requirement by permitting the
'1 See supra notes 2 - 16 and accompanying text (discussion of general guidelines govern-
ing circuit court review of Board decisions).
395 U.S. at 612-16.
15 Id. at 614.
15 Id.
'S Id.
' See NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982) (continu-
ing impact of employer's misconduct is important matter).
'" 640 F.2d at 466; see supra notes 63 -72 and accompanying text (discussion of Gourmet
Meats).
'" 640 F.2d at 465-66; see United Serv. for Handicapped v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 661, 664
(6th Cir. 1982) (specificity requirement supports Gissers Court's finding that elections are
preferred).
"' See supra notes 73 - 76 and accompanying text (discussion of majority opinion in
Permanent Label).
" See supra notes 77 - 81 and accompanying text (discussion of dissenting opinion in
Permanent Label).
" 657 F.2d at 519.
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Board to refuse to conduct the critical analysis concerning whether tradi-
tional remedies will permit an unbiased election.'" In contrast, the Gourmet
Meats court's application of the specificity requirement supports the Gissel
Court's rationale by directing the Board to determine whether traditional
remedies adequately will correct the damage to the election process. 5
The Third Circuit's approach in Gourmet Meats provides effective protec-
tion to an aggrieved party through reasonable judicial review of bargain-
ing order decisions.'
Despite the divergence of views over the specificity requirement,
courts recognize that the Board must apply the bargaining order remedy
uniformly to protect the integrity of the democratic procedures embodied
in the Act."7 Courts apply the specificity requirement to limit the Board's
inconsistent issuance of bargaining orders and prevent the Board from
abusing its remedial discretion.' An incorrect application of the specificity
requirement, however, permits the Board to give undue weight to the
severity of the employer's misconduct and, therefore, alters the essential
inquiry required to determine whether a bargaining order is an appropriate
remedy.'69 A correct application of the specficity requirement protects
employee free choice and insures that the Board will proceed cautiously
in issuing bargaining orders and not apply the extraordinary remedy in
a routine fashion.
70
BENTON J. MATHIS, JR.
164 Id.
640 F2d at 466.
16I Id.
167 See generally supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
16 See generally supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
17o See generally supra notes 62-129 and accompanying text.
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